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Employee Benefits and the
Employment-at-Will Rule
Diane M. Cornell*
Mary Green worked as a manager for the Edward J. Bet-
tinger Company, a sole proprietorship.' When a sales manager left
in 1972 to establish a competing business, Bettinger persuaded
Green, a former employee, to return to work to help meet the seri-
ous threat of competition. 2 As incentive, Bettinger offered Green
a commission based on the productivity of the department she
would manage.3 Productivity increased over the eight years that
Green worked for the company.4 Consequently, Green's income
rose.5
In 1977 Bettinger brought his son into the business, and in
1980, he promoted his son to a position with duties similar to
Green's, but Bettinger's son earned less money.6 Bettinger then
unilaterally reduced Green's commission.7 Green objected to the
reduction, which resulted in a drop in her annual income from
$44,000 to $25,000.8 Green objected, maintaining that she had a
written contract that set the commission rate and required negoti-
ation in the event business exigencies demanded a reduction in her
pay.9 The court ruled, however, that because Bettinger had the
right to fire her, he had the right to reduce her benefits unilater-
* B.A., Hamline University, Summa Cum Laude; M.A., University of Minne-
sota; J.D., University of Minnesota.
1. Green v. Bettinger Co., 608 F. Supp. 35, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
2. Id at 38.
3. Green's salary was $180 per week. In addition, she was to be paid 1% com-
mission on client billings between $30,000 and $45,000 per month; 2% commission
on billings between $45,000 and $55,000; and 3% commission on billings in excess of
$55,000. Id at 39.
4. Monthly billings did not exceed $30,000 from 1973 through 1975, so Green
received no commissions during those years. By 1977, however, monthly billings
began to exceed $55,000 per month. Id, at 39-40.
5. Green earned commissions of $12,783 in 1978, $19,764 in 1979, and $25,940 in
1980. Id at 39.
6. Green earned $33,443 in 1980, while Bettinger's son earned $22,481 in the
same year. Id at 40.
7. The new commission schedule paid 1/2% on monthly billings between
$10,000 and $50,000 and 1% on billings over $50,000. Id
8. Id.
9. Id at 40.
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ally, despite the written contract.' 0 The court agreed with Bet-
tinger." Though her income was cut nearly in half in
contravention of her written contract with her employer, Marcy
Green was forced to accept the pay cut or give up her job, she had
no judicial remedy.
In recent years, a significant number of employees have
sought judicial remedies for loss or reduction of benefits.' 2 Em-
ployees have sued to recover vacation pay,13 commissions,' 4 bo-
nuses,' 5 pensions,16 severance pay,' 7 promotions,' 8 and salary
10. Id. at 41.
11. Id. at 42.
12. Annotation, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful Discharge of At-Will Em-
ployee, 44 ALR4th 1131, § 5 (commissions and bonuses), (1986); Annotation Vaca-
tion Pay Rights of Private Employess Not Covered by Collective Labor Contract, 33
ALR 4th 264, §§ 5,6,8 (vacations and vacation pay) (1986); Annotation, Unemploy-
ment Compensation as Affected by Vacation or Payment in Lieu Thereof, 14
ALR4th 1175, § 4 (1986)'See Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Employer May
Discharge At-Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 ALR4th 544, § 8 (pension and re-
tirement benefits, § 9 (stock options), § 10 (profit sharing plans), § 11 (commissions
and bonuses) (1986); Annotation, Sufficiency of Consideration for Employee Stock
Option Contract, 57 ALR3rd 1241 (1968); Annotation, Construction and Effect of
Severance or Dismissal Pay Provisions of Employment Contract or Collective Labor
Agreement, 40 ALR2d 1044 (1955) (severance pay).
Typical benefits employers offer include vacation, vacation pay, commissions,
bonuses, pensions, severance pay, promotions, and stock options.
13. See, e.g., Phillips v. Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co., 573 S.W.2d 493 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1978) (denying plaintiff vacation pay for vacation he was scheduled to take
two weeks after discharge).
14. See, e.g., Green v. Bettinger Co., 608 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding
employer has unilateral right to modify employee's commissions). See supra notes
1-11 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So.2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding employer's policy of giving annual bonus not contractually
binding on employer).
16. See, e.g., Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959) (denying pen-
sion to employee fired after forty-five years of service to company). The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1976 & Supp. IV
1986), now protects pensions of employees who work for private employers.
Courts have yet to determine whether to extend ERISA to other employee
benefits. The Ninth Circuit stated:
ERISA does not contain a body of contract law to govern the in-
terpretation and enforcement of employee benefit plans. Instead, Con-
gress intended for the courts, borrowing from state law where
appropriate, and guided by the policies expressed in ERISA and other
federal labor laws, to fashion a body of federal common law to govern
ERISA suits.
Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1501-02 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding regulation
promulgated by Department of Labor that interpreted severance pay as "employee
benefit plan" within meaning of ERISA).
The Ninth Circuit limited ERISA coverage by excluding ordinary vacation-
with-pay programs in California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 770 F.2d 856 (1985). ER-
ISA did not protect an executive retirement and death benefit in Belsky v. First
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 818 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1987).
The Supreme Court recently decided three cases brought under ERISA but has
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increases.19 Courts deciding these cases often employ principles
derived from the employment-at-will doctrine. 20
The employment-at-will doctrine has governed the employer
employee relationship since the late nineteenth century.21 The
doctrine provides that if a contract does not fix the term of em-
ployment, either party may terminate the relationship at any
time.22 Because the doctrine is potentially harsh to employees,2 3
courts have developed exceptions to the rule in recent years.24
Courts generally have based exceptions on either public policy or
implied contract theories. 25
Most at-will cases have dealt with discharge from employ-
not determined the range of benefits ERISA covers. See Mackey v. Lanier Collec-
tions Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) (holding ERISA does not forbid gar-
nishment of welfare benefits plan); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1
(1987) (holding ERISA does not preempt Maine statute requiring severance pay in
event of plant closing); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987)
(holding ERISA preempted employee's commonlaw contract and tort claims in suit
involving wrongful termination of disability benefit).
17. See, e.g., Kolka v. Atlas Chem. Indus., 13 Mich. App. 580, 164 N.W.2d 755
(1968) (denying severance pay).
18. See, e.g., Servamerica, Inc. v. Rolfe, 318 So.2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(holding employer had right to discharge employee who left previous job relying on
promised promotion).
19. See, e.g., Lieber v. Union Carbide Corp., Nuclear Div., 577 F. Supp. 562 (E.D.
Tenn. 1983) (statement in policy manual does not give rise to implied contract for
annual employee performance review).
20. Horace G. Wood articulated the rule:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring
at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being specified, is an
indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day
even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.
Horace G. Wood, Master and Servant § 136 (2d ed. 1886).
The effect of the at-will doctrine is to create a rebuttable presumption that
there is no binding agreement regarding the duration of employment. Wood based
his rule upon only four cases and questionable analysis. See infra note 40.
21. William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Em-
ployer Privilege, 21 Idaho L. Rev. 201, 202 (1985).
22. Horace G. Wood, supra note 20, at § 136.
23. See infra note 46-52and accompanying text.
24. See generally Andrew Hill, "Wrongful Discharge" and the Derogation of
the At-Will Employment Doctrine, vii-ix (1987) (describing growing trend of courts
abrogating at-will doctrine).
25. A.B.A. Litigation Section, Employment and Labor Relations Law Commit-
tee, Employment-At-Will: A State-by-State Survey, 1984 Report of the Employ-
ment-At-Will Subcommitte, at 5. Some courts have recognized public policy
exceptions to at-will discharges for whistleblowing, refusing to commit illegal acts,
and jury duty or military service, among others. Id Some courts have interpreted
wording in employee handbooks, personnel manuals, or oral promises given to em-
ployees to be "implied contracts" that create a definite term of employment. Id.
Courts often have been ambiguous about whether the claims lie in tort or contract.
See Andrew Hill, supra note 24, at 17.
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ment rather than recovery of benefits.26 Yet employers often
promise benefits, just as they promise job security, as inducements
to the employee to begin 27 or to continue work for the employer,
28 to work more productively,29 or to work for a lower salary.30 In
dealing with suits for benefits, courts have faced the same di-
lemma they face in contested discharge cases. 31 Some have applied
the employment-at-will doctrine, holding that employers may uni-
laterally grant, modify, or withdraw benefits to at-will-employ-
ees.32  Other courts have developed exceptions to protect
employment benefits which are similar to the exceptions they
have applied to protect at-will employees from certain types of dis-
charges.33 Still other courts have ignored the at-will rule in the
disposition of benefits cases and have applied principles from con-
tract law.34
This article examines the relationship between the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine and employee benefits. Part I discusses the
historical development and current trends of the at-will rule in
discharge cases. Part II analyzes how courts have applied the at-
will doctrine to employee benefits and the difficulties that follow
the application. Part III argues that courts should analyze benefits
claims according to established contract principles rather than ap-
plying the at-will rule and its exceptions. The article concludes
26. See supra note 12.
27. See, e.g., Servamerica, Inc. v. Rolfe, 318 So.2d 178 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1975).
28. See, e.g., Anthony v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143
A.2d 762 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1958).
29. See Leone v. Precision Plumbing & Heating of S. Ariz., Inc., 121 Ariz. 514,
591 P.2d 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (bonus based on reduced cost of construction);
Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 35, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (profit sharing plan).
30. See, e.g., Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959) (employee ac-
cepted lower salary in order to avoid jeopardizing retirement benefits).
31. Courts have been unsure whether to apply the at-will doctrine, sometimes
with harsh results, or to find an exception. See supra note 24.
32. See, e.g., Flint v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 143 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1944)
(court, in applying employment law doctrine to agency relationship, stated if plain-
tiffs were not content with defendant employer's unilateral modification of con-
tract, they could have refused to continue work).
33. See, e.g., Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 356 A.2d 221 (1976) (finding
implied contract for benefits based on written policy statement); see also Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977)(finding implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in promise of bonus); Cook v. Alexander &
Alexander of Conn., Inc., 40 Conn. Supp. 246, 488 A.2d 1295 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1985)
(finding public policy basis for employer to pay bonus to at-will employee).
34. See, e.g., Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967) (finding
employer unjustly enriched and employees entitled to pensions on quasi-contract
theory). Employment relationships have been treated as a special branch of con-
tract law and not subject to the same principles as other contractual relationships.
See infra note 37.
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that application of the suggested analysis will lead to more equita-
ble results because it takes into consideration the expectations of
the parties at the time of employment and because it is applicable
whether or not the employment is for a fixed duration.
Part I. Employment-At-Will and Exceptions to the Doctrine
A. Development of Employment-At-Will
The employment-at-will doctrine is a fairly recent departure
from the English tradition. That tradition, established in four-
teenth-and fifteenth-century England, held that hirings were pre-
sumed to be for one year in the absence of a specified term.3 5 Laws
enacted in the mid-fourteenth century in response to a critical
shortage in the work force36 regulated employment relationships
by fixing wages, compelling the unemployed to work, and forbid-
ding termination of employment before the end of a term.37 Later
enactments expanded employment regulations, and the one year
presumption continued through the nineteenth century.38 Statu-
tory regulation of labor continues in England to this day.39 Ameri-
can courts departed from this tradition in the late nineteenth
century, when they embraced the employment-at will doctrine and
made it part of the common law.40 The at-will doctrine, because it
35. Timothy Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment At will Doctrine: Manage-
ment Considerations, 48 Mo. L. Rev. 855, 859 (1983) (citing 1 William Blackstone,
Commentaries 425-26 (1765)).
36. The "Black Death" devastated the work force and left masters without ser-
vants and crops unharvested. Mark Rothstein, Andria Knapp, & Lance Liebman,
Cases and Materials on Employment Law, 28 (1987).
37. The Ordinance of Labourers was passed in 1349 and the Statute of
Labourers in 1351. Id. They are significant because they made employment con-
tracts different from other contracts by regulating the terms of employment con-
tracts and removing the employment relationship from the common law of
contracts. Id.
38. Id.
39. Susan Marrinan, Employment At-Will: Pandora's Box May Have An At-
tractive Cover, 7 Hamline L. Rev. 155, 157 (1984) (citing Trade Union and Labour
Relations Act, 1974, Schedule I, paragraph 10). England's labor laws require an em-
ployer to provide, upon request, a written statement of reasons for discharge if the
employee has been employed continuously for twenty-six weeks. Id. If a tribunal
determines that the reasons are "unfair," the employee may recover back pay or
reinstatement Id.
40. Before embracing the at-will rule, American courts used two additional ap-
proaches in discharge cases. One analyzed the circumstances surrounding the em-
ployment to infer the terms of the contract. The other approach presumed the
term of employment was the pay interval; thus, an employee paid a monthly salary
was presumed hired for one month. See Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Se-
curity, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 335, 341 n.50 (1974).
Wood's Rule of employment-at-will, see supra note 20, became the dominant
doctrine. Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note at 342. Commentators have
criticized Wood's rejection of the English rule and adoption of employment-at-will,
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permitted employers to discharge employees in response to busi-
ness needs,41 suited the laissez faire business climate of late-nine-
teenth century America. 42 The "freedom of contract" doctrine
inherent in the at-will rule presumed that employer and employee
were in equal bargaining positions.43 The at-will doctrine became
the law in almost all states.44 Courts have held that even "perma-
nent" or "lifetime" employment is at-will because the term is
indefinite.45
arguing that Wood cited only four cases as authority, and those cases were decided
on their facts or touched only tangentially on the employment relationship. Id. See
also Joseph DeGuiseppe, The Effect of the Employment-At-Will Rule on Employee
Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1, 6 (1981) (criti-
cizing Wood's analysis).
An early case adopting the rule was Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y.
117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895) (holding employee hired at annual salary and paid monthly
was at-will and subject to dismissal at any time). The Supreme Court followed the
doctrine in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1907) (holding unconstitutional
federal statute making it a crime to disharge employee for union membership).
Adair was overruled in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(upholding constitutionality of National Labor Relations Act).
41. The fourteenth century Statute of Labourers also responded to the em-
ployer's needs by compelling servants to work a fixed term at fixed wages during a
time when labor was scarce. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. By fix-
ing the term for one year, the English rule guaranteed that workers would be avail-
able to employers during both the planting and harvesting seasons. Id. Workers
also benefited from the rule because employers provided for them during the
winter.
42. Kenneth Mennemeier, Protection from Unjust Discharges: An Arbitration
Scheme, 19 Harv. J. on Legis. 48, 53 (1982).
In most cases, American courts adopting the at-will rule cited Wood's treatise,
supra note 20, as authority, or they cited cases that cited Wood. See, e.g., The Poka-
noket, 156 F. 241, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1907) (quoting Wood). See, e.g., Summers v. Phe-
nix Ins. Co., 50 Misc. 181, 182, 98 N.Y.S. 226, 223 (Sup. Ct. 1906) ("hiring at so much
a year...is an indefinite hiring," citing Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y.
117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895)) (cited in Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra, at 342 n.58).
Other courts applied contemporary contract law. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain
& S. Ry. v. Matthews, 64 Ark. 398, 42 S.W. 902 (1897) (employee gave no considera-
tion for job security provision); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Offutt, 99 Ky. 427, 36 S.W.
181 (1896) (no mutuality of obligation); Durgin v. Baker, 32 Me. 273 (1850) (contract
for definite term "if parties could agree" was too indefinite to establish term of em-
ployment); Edwards v. Seaboard & Roanoke R.R., 121 N.C. 490, 491, 28 S.E. 137, 137
(1897) (parties would have included duration of contract in written document if
they had intended definite term).
43. Marrinan, supra note 39, at 158, citing Adair, 208 U.S. at 174-75. The
Supreme Court portrayed the employment-at-will doctrine as a step toward equal-
izing the bargaining power of employees who had no freedom to leave their jobs
except on the employer's terms. Adair, 298 U.S. at 172-73.
44. Heinsz, supra note 35, at 859. During the substantive due process era the
United States Supreme Court found a constitutional basis for the doctrine. See
Adair, 208 U.S. at 173 (striking down as unconstitutional federal statute that linted
employer's right to discharge employee). See also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915) (striking down as unconstitutional state law which made it illegal for em-
ployer to discharge employee for union membership).
45. See Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156, 1158 (4th Cir. 1982).
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The at-will doctrine allows employers to take unreasonable
advantage of employees.46 One court, for example, ruled in favor
of an employer who discharged an employee employed for forty-
five years.47 By firing the employee one year before he was eligi-
ble for retirement, the employer denied him all pension rights.48
Courts also have found employers to be within their rights when
they have fired workers for reporting illegal acts of other employ-
ees,4 9 filing workers compensation claims,50 refusing to take psy-
chological tests,5 ' or serving on grand juries.5 2
B. Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine
Because of the at-will doctrine's harsh results, some courts
have modified the rule using various tort and contract theories. 53
46. See, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (employees threatened
with discharge if they did not incriminate themselves); Odell v. Humble Oil & Re-
fining Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953) (court found no
tort claim for employees fired after testifying against employer when subpoenaed);
Mines v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 940 (1953) (employee fired after 32 years with company when he refused to
contribute to political campaign of supervisor's candidate; court ruled against em-
ployee in libel suit). See also Lawrence Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev.
1404, 1405-12 (1967) (giving examples of employers' use of threat of discharge to co-
erce employees).
47. Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959).
48. Id. at 76. The employee argued the employer had induced the employee to
turn down more lucrative offers by reminding him he would lose pension benefits
and by assuring him he could work until retirement. Id. The court held he was an
at-will employee and could be terminated without cause. Id. at 79.
49. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (plain-
tiff's complaint that he was fired after reporting bribes, accounting discrepancies,
and misuse of funds held not sufficient to state cause of action for wrongful
discahrge).
50. See, e.g., Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956) (en banc)
(holding employee had no cause of action against employer who allegedly violated
statutory provison against discharging employee who filed worker's compensation
claim).
51. Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977) (holding em-
ployer justified in terminating employees who refused to take psychological tests).
52. Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So.2d 594 (Ala. 1980) (holding em-
ployer could terminate employee who served on grand jury). The Alabama legisla-
ture overruled the Bender decision by statute. See Ala. Code § 12-16-8.1 (1986).
53. Legislatures also have modified the at-will rule. See National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3) (1982) (prohibiting retaliatory
discharge for union activity and layoff or terminations under certain circum-
stances); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(a)(1) (1982);
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982); Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act § If(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982); Vietnam Era Vet-
erans Readjustment Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1982).
State legislatures have created additional protection for certain groups of em-
ployees. Some have enacted "whistleblower" statutes which protect employees who
report violations of the law. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 181.932 (1988 & Supp.). Several
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The theories sometimes overlap, and courts do not always state
clearly which theory they are using.5 4
1. The Public Policy Exception
Most states finding an exception to the at-will doctrine have
used public policy as a basis,55 holding that an employer may not
discharge an employee for a reason that offends public policy.56
The usual sources of public policy are constitutions, administrative
regulations, statutes, or judicial decisions.57 Courts have applied
the public policy exception 58 to cases where an employee was fired
for refusing to commit an unlawful act,59 peforming a public obli-
states prohibit discharge for political activities. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
56 § 33 (West 1988). Others have laws against retaliatory discharge for filing
worker's compensation claims. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 287.780 (Vernon Supp.
1988). Legislation that would protect employees who are not covered by collective
bargaining agreements has been introduced in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wiscon-
sin. See The Employment-At-Will Issue, Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Special Report)
Vol. III, No. 23 (Nov. 22, 1982) at 11-12.
54. Courts often use the terms "wrongful discharge," "abusive discharge," "re-
taliatory discharge," "bad faith discharge," and "discharge against public policies"
interchangeably. The ambiguity becomes more confusing because of a "tendency to
combine tort and contract theories and the inclination to plead causes-of-action in
general rather than specific terms." Mauk, supra note 21 at 207.
55. See infra notes 56-62. Twenty-nine states have recognized a public policy
exception as of 1986. See generally, Andrew Hill, supra note 24 (summarizing sta-
tus of at-will rule in each state). Since Hill's study, Minnesota has recognized a
public policy exception. See Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569
(Minn. 1987) (employee discharged after refusing to pump leaded gasoline in viola-
tion of federal Clean Air Act). Minnesota has codified a "whistleblower" exception
to protect employees who report illegal acts of their employers. See Minn. Stat.
§ 181.932 (1988). Montana had codified its public policy exception into state law, see
Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-505 (1985), but repealed the statute in 1987.
56. Andrew Hill, supra note 24 at 27.
57. See Townsend v. L.W.M. Management, Inc., 64 Md. App. 55, 61, 494 A.2d
239, 242 (1985). A few courts have defined public policy more broadly: "In general,
it can be said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the
citizens of the state collectively .... [A] matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's
social rights, duties, and responsibilities." Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981).
58. See Andrew Hill, supra note 24 at 28.
59. See Winther v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 100 (D. Colo. 1985) (employee
alleged he was dismissed for refusing to take part in activities violating antitrust
laws); Hansrote v. American Indus. Technologies, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 113 (W.D. Pa.
1984) (applying Delaware law) (employee discharged for refusing to participate in
illegal conduct of company); Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
174 Ca. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (employee discharged after refusing to com-
mit perjury); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987)
(employee had cause of action for wrongful discharge for refusing to pump leaded
gasoline in violaition of federal Clean Air Act); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J.
Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978) (technician discharged after refusing to perform
catheterization of patient when state law required procedure to be performed by
physician or nurse); Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 122 L.R.R.M. 2076 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1985) (employees discharged after refusing to violate vehicle speed limits).
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gation,60 exercising a statutory right or privilege, 61 and reporting
an employer's unlawful conduct.62 A few courts have found a pub-
lic policy exception based in common law when the employer
acted in bad faith or against community standards.63
2. The Implied Unilateral Contract Exception
A growing number of jurisdictions have used the theory of
implied unilateral contract6 to modify the at-will rule. Under this
60. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625) (employee al-
legedly fired to prevent her from testifying against employer); Palmateer v. Inter-
national Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill, 1981) (employee dismissed
after giving information to police); Bartley v. University Asphalt Co., Inc., 129 Ill.
App.3d 231, 472 N.E.2d 499 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 111 Ill. 2d 318, 489
N.W.2d 1367 (1986) (material issue of fact as to employee was dismissed for cooper-
ating in FBI investigation of employer precluded summary judgment for employer).
61. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (Employee
allegedly discharged for refusing to lobby for eliminating no-fault automobile insur-
ance. Court found cause of action may arise under constitution if state law did not
provide remedy.); Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So.2d 182
(Fla. 1983) (employee discharged filing worker's compensation claim); Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 249, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (employee discharged for filing
worker's compensation claim); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of
Labor Serv., 6 Kan. App.2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981) (employee discharged for filing
worker's compensation claim held to have cause of action); DeBleecker v. Mont-
gomery County, 292 Md. App. 498, 438 A.2d 1348 (1982) (employee discharged by
public employer allegedly in violation of first amendment rights), but see Evans v.
Bibb Co., 178 Ga. App. 139, 342 S.E.2d 484 (1986) (refusing to recognize public policy
exception where employee discharged for filing worker's compensation claim).
62. See Kistler v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Kan.
1985) (facts existed to preclude summary judgment for employer; employee dis-
charged after testifying against employer at administrative hearing); Sheets v.
Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (employee allegedly
discharged for reporting employer's violation of statute regulating labels on food
products held to have cause of action); Schmidt v. Yardney Elec. Corp., 4 Conn.
App. 69, 492 A.2d 512 (1985) (employee discharged for reporting employer's fraudu-
lent insurance claim stated cause of action for wrongful discharge); Brown v. Physi-
cians Mut. Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (employee allegedly
discharged for reporting illegal conduct had cause of action for wrongful discharge);
Boyle v. Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (employee dismissed af-
ter threatening to report employer's violation of federal safety regulations stated
claim for wrongful discharge).
63. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 188, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1958) (holding public policy based on "principles
under which freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by law for good of
community").
64. Every contract has at least two parties. The contract is bilateral if both par-
ties have made promises. A contract in which only one party has made a promise,
and therefore only that party is subject to a legal obligation, is a unilateral contract.
For example, if A offers B ten dollars to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge, A has
made an offer for a contract which B accepts by performing the act, and the con-
tract is unilateral. If A had asked B instead to make a promise to do something, the
contract would have been bilateral. John Calamari & Joseph Perillo, Contracts 3d
§ 1-10 (1987).
Law and Inequality [Vol. 8:355
theory, employer representations in employee handbooks,65 per-
sonnel policy statements, 66 and oral promises67 to discharge em-
ployees only for just cause or only after following specified
procedures may create contractual obligations even absent mutual
consent.6 8
Courts typically have followed a four-part test in determining
the existence of an implied unilateral contract.69 The terms of the
offer must be definite in form, communicated to the offeree, ac-
cepted by the offeree, and enforceable by reason of adequate con-
65. See, e.g., Vinyard v. King, 728 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Oklahoma
law); Hass v. Picker Int'l, 122 L.R.R.M. 2367 (D. Mass. 1986); Thompson v. Ameri-
can Motor Inns, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Va. 1985); Wagner v. Sperry Univac,
458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law), but see Richardson v.
Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 320 Pa. Super. 106, 466 A.2d 1084 (1983) (expressly
rejecting possiblility that handbook could give rise to enforceable promise); see also
Breedon v. City of Nome 628 P.2d 924 (Alaska 1981); Leikvold v. Valley View Com-
munity Hosp., 688 P.2d 170 (Ariz. 1984); Wing v. JMB Property Management Corp.,
714 P.2d 916 (Colo. App. 1985); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 613 (D.C.
App. 1985); Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 724 P.2d 110 (Haw. 1986);
Harkness v. City of Burley, 658 P.2d 883 (Idaho 1986); Duldulao v. St. Mary of Naz-
areth Hosp. Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482 (1987); Larabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc.,
486 A.2d (Me. 1984); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn.
1983); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. App. 1983); Morris v. Lutheran
Medical Center, 340 N.W.2d 388 (Neb. 1983); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahinad, 668
P.2d 261 (Nev. 1983); Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985);
Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d 191 (N.M. 1980); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483
N.E.2d 150 (Ohio 1985); Wyss v. Inskeep, 699 P.2d 1161, rev. denied, 707 P.2d 582
(Ore. 1985); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983); Abbott v.
Kellwood Co., No. 38-30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.3, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn.
file); Benoir v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 514 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1986); Roberts v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 568 P.2d 764 (Wash. 1977); Cook v. Heck's Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W.Va.
1986); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 1985); Armstrong v. American Col-
loid Co., 721 P.2d 1069 (Wyo. 1986).
66. See Flowers v. Area Agency on Aging of Southeast Arkansas, Inc., 574 F.
Supp. 71 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Pima College v. Sinclair, 17 Ariz. App. 213, 496 P.2d 639
(1972); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292
N.W.2d 880 (1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, In., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443
N.E.2d 441 (1982); Tiranno v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 99 A.D.2d 675, 472 N.Y.S.2d 49
(1984); Hedrick v. Center for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment, 7 Ohio App.
3d 211, 454 N.E.2d 1343 (1982).
67. See Stover v. Alabama Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 467 So.2d 251 (Ala. 1985);
Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983);
Glover v. Sager, 667 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1983); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.
App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co., 86 Cal.
App. 3d 714, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1978); Terrio v. Millenocket Community Hospital,
379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977) (hospital personnel manual, retirement policy, and oral
staetments by administrator were sufficient evidence to support finding of contract
for definite term); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443
N.E. 441 (1982).
68. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 614, 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980) (stating employer representation in personnel manual cre-
ated "contractual rights in the employees without evidence that the parties mutu-
ally agreed that the policy statements would create contractual rights").
69. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626-27 (Minn. 1983).
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sideration.70 In a recent case,71 for example, a court held an
employee handbook outlining disciplinary procedures constituted a
binding unilateral contract.72 An employee accepted by continuing
to work after receiving the handbook and thus provided considera-
tion.73 When the employer discharged an employee without fol-
lowing the procedures, the court found a breach of contract.74
3. Promissory Estoppel
A related contract-based theory is promissory estoppel.
Under this theory, detrimental reliance may make a promise en-
forceable. 75 A small minority of courts has applied promissory es-
toppel in at-will discharge cases. 76 These courts have held that an
employer is estopped from discharging an at-will employee with-
out cause when the employer has promised permanent employ-
ment in return for the employee transferring his business to the
employer,77 giving up a former job,78 transferring property to the
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 627.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 631.
75. John Calamari & Joseph Perillo, supra note 64, § 6-1 (1987). The promis-
sory estoppel doctrine was born in the First Restatement, which stated, "A promise
which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does in-
duce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the promise." Restatement, Contracts § 90 (1952). The Second
Restatement expanded the doctrine by liberalizing its application. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 90 (1970) made four changes which created a more flexible
doctrine. It removed the words "of a definite and substantial character" from the
text. Comment b indicates that the definite and substantial nature of the reliance
is one of several factors to consider. It permitted greater flexibility of remedy so
that a promise reasonably relied upon is enforceable to the extent of the reliance.
It allowed for third party reliance on a promise that the promisor made to the
promisee. Finally, it provided that a charitable contribution or a marriage settle-
ment is binding without proof that the recipient acted or abstained from acting. See
Charles Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promis-
sory Estoppel, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 52 (1981).
76. See Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark.
1982); Glover v. Sager, 667 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1983); Shetts v. Teddy's Frosted Foods,
Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980); Chantelier v. Robertson, 118 So.2d 241 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1960), but see Servamerica, Inc., v. Rolfe, 318 So.2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (employer not estopped from discharging employee who left former job in re-
liance on promise of promotion); Revelo v. County of Hawaii, 658 P.2d 883 (Haw.
1983); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 490 N.E.2d 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Lopp v.
Peerless Serum Co., 382 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1964); Burkhimer v. Gealy, 250 S.E.2d 678
(N.C. App. 1979), rev. denied, 254 S.E.2d 918 (N.C. 1979); Jones v. East Center for
Community Mental Health, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 969 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
77. Chantelier v. Robertson, 118 So.2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
78. See Murphree v. Alabama Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 449 So.2d 1218 (Ala. 1984);
Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
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employer,7 9 relocating,8 0 or giving up a legal claim against the
employer.81
4. Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Finally, a few jurisdictions have recognized an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing as an exception to employment-
at-will.8 2 Modern contract law requires parties to a contract to act
in good faith.83 In an early case addressing the good faith issue,8 4 a
court held that firing an employee to avoid paying commissions vi-
olated an implied covenant of good faith and therefore constituted
a breach of contract.8 5
Of states adopting the covenant of good faith exception, only
California expressly has adopted it as part of all employment con-
79. Lopp v. Peerless Serum Co., 382 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1964).
80. Burkhimer v. Gealy, 250 S.E.2d 678 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979), rev. denied, 254
S.E.2d 918 (N.C. 1979).
81. Sides v. Duke Hosp., 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
82. See Grayson v. American Airlines, Inc., 803 F.2d 1097 (10th Cir. 1986) (ap-
plying Oklahoma law); Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev.
1985) (applying Nevada law) (covenant implied in contracts where there is "special
element of reliance"); Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (applying Illinois law); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983);
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985); Mafnan v.
Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984); Kulins v. Malco, a Microdot Co.,
Inc., 459 N.E.2d 1038 (Ill. App. 1984); Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693
P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984); Hall v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985);
Wyss v. Inskeep, 699 P.2d 1161, rev. denied, 707 P.2d 582 (Ore. 1985). But see
Walker v. Modern Realty of Mo., Inc., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Mis-
souri law) (refusing to recognize implied covenant in at-will employment contract);
Salazar v. Furr's Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403 (D.N.M. 1986) (applying New Mexico law);
Smith v. Hartford Ins. Co., No. 85-2323, slip op. (E.D. Pa. 1985) (applying New
Jersey law); Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1359
(D.S.C. 1985) (applying South Carolina law); Hunter v. H.D. Lee Co., Inc., 563 F.
Supp. 1006 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (applying Kansas law) (refusing to recognize implied
covenant exception); Kempe v. Prince Gardner, Inc., 569 F. Supp 9 (E.D. Mo. 1983)
(applying Missouri law); Vasques v. National Geographic Soc'y, No. J. 81-3008 (D.
Md. 1982) (applying Maryland law) (holding every employment contract does not
include implied covenant); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw.
1983) (specifically rejecting implied covenant claim); Larabee v. Penobscot Frozen
Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984); Hunt v. IBM Mid-America Employees Union,
384 N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1986); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081
(Wash. 1984); Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985).
83. See generally, Eric Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith:
Good-Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 381 (1978).
The Second Restatement provides that "[e]very contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1979).
Similarly, the Uniform Commercial Code states, "Every contract or duty
within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment." U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978).
84. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
85. Id. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
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tracts.8 6 Other courts and some commentators have criticized the
doctrine of implied covenant as unworkable and inappropriate 7 or
disapproved of it as an abrogation of the at-will rule.88 Still others
have criticized the doctrine because it combines contract and tort
theories.89 Despite controversy surrounding the doctrine, some ju-
risdictions continue to apply the implied covenant exception.90
Thus, although some courts have recognized public policy ex-
ceptions to the at-will rule, and other jurisdictions have recognized
exceptions based on contract principles including implied unilat-
eral contracts, promissory estoppel, and the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, a few states have adhered strictly to
the at-will doctrine.91 The result is a doctrine riddled with excep-
86. James Dawson & Paul Zech, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,
Bench & B. Minn., Apr. 1986, at 15-16. The seminal case is Cleary v. American Air-
lines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). The court ruled that the
termination of an employee after eighteen years of service without just cause vio-
lated the implied covenant, giving rise to an action in tort as well as in contract. Id.
at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
87. "[T]here simply is no need for this additional and confusing claim." Dawson
& Zech, supra note 86, at 18. Appellate courts in Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin have rejected the implied covenant as part
of employment contracts. Id. The Wisconsin supreme court stated that courts
should not become "arbiters of any termination that may have a tinge of bad faith
attached." Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983).
88. The New York Court of Appeals rejected the theory, saying that such an
agreement between the parties could not exist, because "it would be incongruous to
say that ... the employer impliedly agreed to a provision which would be destruc-
tive of his right to termination." Murphy v. American Home Prods., Inc., 58 N.Y.2d
293, 304-05, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (1983).
89. Courts have contorted their reasoning "to try to fit the holdings within the
framework of contract law priniciples generally recognized as governing employ-
ment realtionships." Robert Williams & Thomas Bagby, Allis-Chalmers Corpora-
tion v. Lueck: The Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision on Wrongful Discharge
Suits and Other State Court Employment Litigation (1986), at 22.
In one of the first cases departing from the at-will rule, the court blended con-
tract and tort theories in its holding, stating that "termination by the employer of a
contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based
on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public good
and constitutes a breach of the employment contract." Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
90. See supra note 82.
91. States that adhere to the at-will doctrine include: Alabama: Has declined to
recognize public policy or implied contract exceptions, but an employer may be es-
topped from discharging an employee at will if the employee has relocated or given
up a former job in reliance on employer's promise. See, e.g., Scott v. Lane, 409
So.2d 791 (Ala. 1982). Delaware: Has held employee handbooks are unilateral ex-
pressions of company policy and not contractually binding; see Heidick v. Kent
General Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982). The Delaware courts have not recog-
nized a public policy exception. Georgia: Has refused to find public policy excep-
tions or to recognize implied contract claims except in one instance, see Fletcher v.
Amax, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 692, 288 S.E.2d 49 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Amax, Inc. v.
Fletcher, 166 Ga. App. 789, 305 S.E.2d 601 (App. 1983) (promissory estoppel). Iowa:
Has not recognized either implied contract or public policy exception. Louisiana:
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tions based on differing tort, contract, and policy theories, depend-
ing upon the jurisdiction and the facts of each case.92
Part II. Employment-At-Will and Employee Benefits
A. The At-Will Rule and Denial of Benefits
Some jurisdictions adhere strictly to the employment-at-will
doctrine and allow no exceptions either for discharge or for em-
ployees seeking benefits.93 Other jurisdictions, although finding
exceptions to the at-will rule with respect to terminations, have
not extended those exceptions to cases involving benefits of at-will
employees.94 The theory supporting denial of benefits is that be-
Has rejected implied contracts under handbooks, see Thibodeaux v. Southwest Lou-
isiana Hosp. Ass'n, 488 So.2d 743 (La. Ct. App. 1986); oral promises, see Baynard v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co., 339 So.2d 1200 (La. Ct. App. 1981); promissory estoppel, see
Griffith v. Sollat Found. Drilling, Inc., 373 So.2d 979 (La. App. 1979). Louisiana also
has rejected all public policy exceptions; see, e.g., Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So.2d
706 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 414 So.2d 397 (La. 1982) (no public policy ex-
ception for employee discharged for refusing to break law). Mississippi: Has refused
to recognize public policy exception, see Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397
So.2d 874 compensation claim); implied contract claim will be recognized only if
employee provides additional consideration, see Sartin v. Columbus Utils. Comm'n,
421 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Miss. 1976). See also Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247 (Miss.
1985) (court refused to recognize implied contract claim but noted harsh result of
at-will rule). New York: Has held tenaciously to at-will doctrine established in
landmark case Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
Courts have resisted both public policy and implied contract exceptions. North Da-
kota: Has not recognized public policy exceptions; rejected implied contract claim
based on handbook in Wadeson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 267
(N.D. 1984). Rhode Island: Has rejected public policy claim in Brainard v. Imperi-
cal Mfg. Co., 571 F. Supp. 37 (D.R.I. 1983). Utah: Has refused to find implied con-
tract in handbook or to apply promissory estoppel, see Bullock v. Desert Dodge
Truck Center, Inc., 354 P.2d 559 (Utah 1960). No public policy exceptions have
been recognized.
92. Pennsylvania is the most inconsistent jurisdiction on the issue. State courts
have found a cause of action for wrongful discharge in five of seven times such
claims were brought, but federal courts applying Pennsylvania law have upheld the
at-will rule in twenty-eight of the thirty-seven cases they have adjudicated. See,
e.g., Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (rec-
ognizing public policy exception to at-will rule for employee discharged for missing
work to serve on jury). But ef. Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir.
1984) (applying Pennsylvania law) (holding no public policy exception granted for
woman discharged after refusing sexual advances). Uncertainty and ambiguity in-
fuse both implied contract and tort areas. See Andrew Hill, supra note 24, at 115-
17.
93. See supra note 91.
94. See, e.g., Lieber v. Union Carbide Corp., Nuclear Div., 577 F. Supp. 562 (E.D.
Tenn. 1983) (applying Tennessee law) (annual performance appraisal described in
manual did not create contract); Borden v. Skinner Chuck Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 184,
150 A.2d 607 (1958) (bonus described in handbook could be withheld at board of di-
rectors' discretion); Rowell v. Jones & Vining, Inc., 524 A.2d 1208 (Me. 1987) (vaca-
tion policy does not constitute contract); Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 227 Md. 471, 356
A.2d 221 (1976) (laid off employees not entitled to vacation pay as provided in pol-
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cause the employer may discharge the employee at any time, the
employer also has the right to modify the employment relationship
unilaterally at any time.95 The employee has the choice of ac-
cepting the new conditions or terminating the employment. 96
Courts have extended this rationale to find that when an employer
denies or modifies benefits and employees continue to work, the
parties have modified the employment contract.97
For example, in Green v. Bettinger,98 an employer unilater-
ally reduced an employee's commission schedule that had been in
effect for eight years, despite the employee's objection.9 9 The em-
ployee resigned and brought suit, claiming the owner's unilateral
modification of the commission schedule, and the employee's "con-
structive discharge" for refusing to accept it, were breaches of her
employment contract.1 00 The court ruled in favor of the employer,
concluding that the "undoubted right to terminate an at-will con-
tract necessarily includes the right to insist upon changes in the
compensation arrangements as a condition of continued
employment."lol
When applied to employee benefits, the at-will doctrine im-
poses a hardship on one party, the employee, that would be unac-
ceptable in other areas of contract law. In non-employment
agreements both parties must agree to a modification. If one party
proposes a modification-to pay the other party less than origi-
icy and procedure manual); Kolka v. Atlas Chem. Indus., 13 Mich. App. 580, 164
N.W.2d 755 (1968) (denying severance pay); Skramstad v. Otter Tail County, 417
N.W.2d 124 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (retired employee not entitled to severance pay
as promised in policy manual); Edwards v. County of Hennepin, 397 N.W.2d 584
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (oral promise of working schedule not enforceable contract);
Tobias v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 362 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (denying
overtime meal allowances as described in personnel manual); Haiice v. United Fam-
ily Life Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (promise in letter of Carib-
bean cruise if employee met sales quota not binding contract); Phillips v. Memphis
Furniture Mfg. Co., 573 S.W.2d 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (discharged employee not
entitled to vacation pay); Douglass v. Panama, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1974) (oral
promise of bonus not binding contract).
95. See, e.g., Gebhard v. Royce Aluminum Corp., 296 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1961)
(holding "[s]ince defendant could discharge plaintiff at any time, it could equally
initiate modification at any time").
96. Flint v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 143 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1944)
(agency contract was terminable at will, and if employees didn't like modification,
they should have refused to continue work).
97. See Gebhard v. Royce Aluminum Corp., 296 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1961) (em-
ployee accepted change in commission rate by continuing to work and accepting re-
duced pay).
98. 608 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1984). See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying
text.
99. Id. at 40.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 42.
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nally agreed-the new terms would be unenforceable under com-
mon law because there would be purported modification without
consideration.102 Modern contract law permits modification to
meet changed circumstances, 0 3 but any modification must be "fair
and equitable."104 In employment contracts, however, courts do
not require any modification to be "fair and equitable."'10 5 They do
not require employers to furnish additional consideration when
they unilaterally reduce or withdraw benefits, nor do they require
that employees assent to the proposed modification.
B. Application of Employment-At-Will Exceptions to
Employee Benefits
1. Public Policy
Courts have attempted to soften the hardships for employees
whose benefits are denied by applying the exceptions to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine.' 0 6 Few plaintiffs have litigated cases on
102. W.L. Thaxton Constr. Co. v. O.K. Constr. Co., 295 S.E.2d 822 (W. Va. 1982).
103. "A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either
side is binding a) if the modification is fair and equitable .. .b) to the extent pro-
vided by statute; or c) to the extent that justice requires enforcement ...." Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts § 89 (1979).
See also U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 2 (1977) (contracts for sale of goods may be
effectively modified without consideration but must meet test of good faith. "Ex-
tortion of "modification" without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as vio-
lation of duty of good faith"). "The presence or absence of good faith will be
proved by circumstantial evidence and may in some situations require an objec-
tively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification." There must be a good busi-
ness reason for asking for readjustment. The proposal to modify may not be a form
of extortion. Hawkland U.C.C. Series § 2-209 at 129 (1984).
104. "The limitation to a modification which is 'fair and equitable' goes beyond
absence of coercion and requires an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a
modification.... The reason for modification must rest in circumstances not antici-
pated' as part of the context in which the contract was made." Restatement (Sec-
ond) of contracts § 89 comment b. (1979).
105. See Gebhard v. Royce Aluminum Corp., 296 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1961). An em-
ployee objected to unilateral modification of his commission rate. He told the court
that he accepted the reduced amount of pay "because he had to," but he never
agreed to any change, and so the origianl agreement remained in effect. The court
commented, "[ijt is difficult to think that even a layman could believe this." Id. at
19. Contra, Simpson v. Norwesco, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1102 (D. S.D. 1977), aff'd, 583
F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1978).
Although courts have not required consideration when an employer reduced or
withheld benefits, they have required consideration from an employee who at-
tempted to collect promised benefits. In Kolka v. Atlas Chem. Indus., 13 Mich.
App. 580, 164 N.W.2d 755 (1968), an employee was on a disability leave of absence
when the plant where he had worked for fifteen years closed. The employee sued
for severance pay. The court refused to award it, saying, "[a]n offer of separation
pay, to be accepted by an employee, requires the giving up or forbearance to exer-
cise some legal right." Id. at 581, 164 N.W.2d at 756. Because the employee was not
working when the plant closed he had nothing to give up as consideration. Id.
106. See supra notes 55-56, 65-68, 75, 83.
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the theory that the employer violated public policy by withholding
benefits.107 While many jurisdictions have recognized public policy
exceptions for employee discharges,108 the exception is more appli-
cable to discharges than to benefits. First, discharges that offend
public policy are generally retaliatory.109 Employers rarely reduce
benefits in retaliation when they have the power to fire an em-
ployee. Second, even when withholding of benefits accompanies a
discharge, in order to award relief, courts generally have required
a "clear mandate of a specific public policy.""i 0 Courts have
avoided defining public policy themselves."' While statutes fre-
quently define illegal discharges,"12 few statutes address denial of
employee benefits.'1 3 In a rare example, a Connecticut court
found a public policy exception enabling an employee to collect bo-
nuses and thrift plan benefits, by ruling that those benefits consti-
tuted unpaid wages for which the employer was liable under a
statute requiring employers to pay all wages. n 4 Generally, how-
ever, plaintiffs have not found a cause of action for benefits under
the public policy exception."i 5
2. Implied Unilateral Contract
Plaintiffs frequently have found a cause of action for recov-
107. See supra note 12.
108. See supra note 55.
109. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
110. Burns v. Preston Trucking Co., 621 F. Supp. 366 (D. Conn. 1986) (applying
Connecticut law).
111. See Note, At-Will Termination-Contractual Limitation of an Employer's
Right to Terminate: Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W2d 622 (Minn.
1983), 7 Hamline L. Rev. 463, 468 (1984) [hereinafter Note, At-Will Termination).
But see Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), in which the
court recognized a cause of action based on non-statutory policies. "No other juris-
diction has adopted this broad view of the public policy exception." Note, At-Will
Termination, supra note 24, at 468. New Hampshire's broad definition has been at-
tacked for being based on "social and moral judgments" rather than on public pol-
icy as defined by statute. See Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140,
1146 (N.H. 1981) (Bois, J., dissenting).
112. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
113. ERISA, supra note 16 protects pension benefits of employees of private
businesses. In addition, some states have passed constitutional amendments to pro-
tect pensions of public employees. See Mark Rothstein, Andria Knapp, & Lance
Liebman, supra note 36, at 1025. Statutes require employers to pay FICA (Social
Security) taxes, unemployment compensation, and worker's compensation. Id. at
384. Although states may legislate some benefits, most benefits are customary or
voluntary. Id.
114. Cook v. Alexander & Alexander of Conn., Inc., 488 A.2d 1295 (Conn. Super.
1985).
115. Plaintiffs more frequently have brought suit in tort to recover benefits
under the theory of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See irfra
notes 165-78.
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ery of benefits, nonetheless, in jurisdictions where courts have ap-
plied the implied unilateral contract exception. In those
jurisidictions courts look for an offer for benefits made either in
an oral promise 116 or implied in employee handbooks,117 personnel
manuals, or policy and procedure statements."18 The employee
demonstrates his consent to the offer by not quitting the job, he
accepts by performance rather than by promise, 119 and he meets
the requirement of consideration by continuing to work when he
has a right to resign.120
Employers have defended against benefits claims by arguing
that the benefits are gratuitous promises with no mutuality of obli-
gation,121 no consideration, 122 and no bargaining.123 Although lack
of mutuality of obligation remains a successful defense in employ-
ment cases, 124 the modern view is that a contract does not require
exchange of identical promises.125 Instead, "the requirement for
mutuality of obligation [is]... simply the requirement that there
be consideration."126
In finding the consideration requirement has been met, some
116. See, e.g., Hartung v. Billmeier, 243 Minn. 148, 66 N.W.2d 784 (1954). But see
Edwards v. County of Hennepin, 397 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (hiring of-
ficer's oral promise not enforceable contract).
117. See Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
118. See Fujimoto v. Rio Grande Pickle Co., 414 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969).
119. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Brydges v. Coast Wide Land, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 223, 467 P.2d 209
(1970).
121. See, e.g., Alfaro v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 173 Ind. App. 89, 362 N.E.2d 500
(1977).
122. See, e.g., Anthony v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143
A.2d 762 (1958).
123. See, e.g., Lieber v. Union Carbide Corp., Nuclear Div., 577 F. Supp. 562 (E.D.
Tenn. 1983).
124. See, e.g., Simmons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 311 So.2d 28, 31 (La. Ct. pp.
1975).
125. "[T]here is no analytical reason why an employee's promise to render serv-
ices, or his actual rendition of services over time, may not support an employer's
promise both to pay a particular wage (for example) and to refrain from arbitrary
dismissal." Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,
325-26 (1981).
126. Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976). The court
applied this theory of consideration to a case in which plaintiffs who lost their jobs
brought suit for severance pay. See Anthony v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 51
N.J. Super. 139, 143 A.2d 762 (1958). The employer argued that publication and dis-
tribution of the severance pay rule was a "mere gratuitous promise of a bonus," not
supported by consideration to the employer or detriment to the employees, and the
employees were free to quit at will. Id. at 143, 143 A.2d at 764. The court said the
employer's argument contemplated a bilateral contract, in which a promise is ex-
changed for a promise, when in fact the employer submitted an offer in return for
rendition of services-a unilateral contract. Id. See supra note 64. The employees
were able to bind the employer to his promise of severance pay by continuing to
work after the employer offered new terms. Id. at 146, 143 A.2d at 766.
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courts have suggested the employer received consideration because
benefit plans tend "to better employee morale, improve perform-
ance and lessen turnover, all to the distinct advantage of the em-
ployer."127 More recent decisions specifically have held that an at-
will employee offers consideration for benefits by increased pro-
ductivity and continued work,128 and as in other contract relation-
ships, the court will not inquire into the adequacy of
consideration.129 The rule is not settled, however, and some courts
have required additional consideration from the employee for addi-
tional benefits.130
In regard to bargaining, employers also have argued success-
fully that they should not be held to promises made in policy state-
ments or employee handbooks because employees did not bargain
for them.131 One court, for example, refused to find provisions for
an annual review and consequent increased benefits as detailed in
a personnel manual to be contractually binding on the em-
ployer.132 The court found no "meeting of the minds by the
parties."133
Another employer defense has been based on lack of commu-
nication. The implied unilateral contract theory requires the em-
ployer communicate the offer to the employee,134 but courts have
not agreed on how she must do it. Courts have reached differing
results on the issues of whether the employer must communicate
the offer of benefits to each employee, whether the employee is
entitled to a benefit she learns about from a manual or from an-
other employee, and whether the employer must actually intend to
offer a benefit.7.3 5
Some courts have held that a benefit must be communicated
to each employee individually.136 Thus, when an employer com-
127. Id. at 144, 143 A.2d at 764.
128. Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
129. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
924-25 (1981) (holding that independent consideration requirement "is contrary to
general contract principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of
consideration").
130. See, e.g., Kolka v. Atlas Chem. Indus., 13 Mich. App. 580, 164 N.W.2d 755
(1968) (requiring extra consideration from employees). See supra note 105.
131. See McQueeney v. Glenn, 400 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), cert denied,
449 U.S. 1125 (1981) (employee handbook not contractually binding because no mu-
tual bargaining over terms).
132. Lieber v. Union Carbide Corp., Nuclear Div., 577 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Tenn.
1983).
133. Id. at 564.
134. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
135. See irnfra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
136. See Alfaro v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 173 Ind. App. 89, 362 N.E.2d 500 (1977).
Severance pay was a gratuitous benefit according to the court, because the em-
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municated an offer of severance pay to some employees and not to
others, the employer was bound contractually only to those to
whom the offer was made.137 Other courts have found that bene-
fits described in manuals were not communicated to all employees
when the employer distributed the manuals only to supervisors' 38
or personnel managers. x39
Other courts have held that written policies regarding bene-
fits are contractual obligations, even if the employer did not com-
municate them directly to employees 140 and even if the employees
had not seen the policies and did not know the particulars but
knew the policies existed. 141
Thus, by using the implied unilateral contract theory, courts
have been able to find an implied contract where an employer ap-
peared to have offered a benefit which he later unilaterally modi-
fied or withdrew,142 or when the employer gave a benefit to some
employees but not equally to all similarly situated employees.143
There are three major problems with the implied unilateral
contract theory. The first is the matter of communicating the of-
fer for a unilateral contract.'" Courts have not agreed on whether
the employer must communicate the offer 45 and whether she
must have actual intent to make an offer in the communication.146
ployer put information about it into a confidential memo. Id. at 96-97, 362 N.E.2d at
505.
137. See Hilton v. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., 66 Wash. 2d 30, 400 P.2d 772 (1965)
(employer promised severance pay to some but not all employees in office to be
closed).
138. See Skramstad v. Otter Tail County, 417 N.W.2d 124 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
139. See Tobias v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 362 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985). The plaintiffs learned about a benefit, meal allowances for managers who
worked overtime, from a personnel policy manual. The court declined to award the
benefit to the employees, reasoning that the employer had not communicated the
offer to them. Two of the three plaintiffs were personnel managers and had copies
of the manual for use in their work.
140. See Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 356 A.2d 221 (1976).
141. Id. See also Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. Ct. App.
1971). The employer contended that it did not intend to communicate an offer of
severance pay to all employees when it distributed a policy statement only to de-
partment heads and managers. The court rejected the employer's argument, find-
ing it sufficient that the information was otherwise disseminated to employees. Id.
at 501. See also Wyss v. Inskeep, 73 Or. App. 661, 699 P.2d 1161 (1985) (employee
knowledge of written bonus plan sufficient, even if employees had not seen it, so
long as terms of plan were definite enough to be ascertained); Martin v. Mann Mer-
chandising, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (binding employer to sever-
ance pay benefit even though employee learned of benefit from other employees).
142. See, e.g., Anthony v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143
A.2d 762, 766-67 (App. Div. 1958).
143. See, e.g., Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. Ct. 1971).
144. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
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Courts have constructed legal fictions to deal with the communica-
tion issues.147
The concept of the unilateral contract as opposed to a bilat-
eral contract also may be invalid. Recent authorities, including the
Second Restatement of Contracts148 and the Uniform Commercial
Code,149 have abandoned the terminology. In doing so, these au-
thorities made an attempt to avoid the rigidity of mechanical appli-
cation of one concept or the other.150 Thus, when courts have
based a finding in favor of an employee on a distinction between
bilateral and unilateral contracts in employment-at-will cases, they
may have drawn an artificial dichotomy.151
A third problem confronting courts is the matter of interpret-
ing language generally, and disclaimers specifically, in employee
handbooks. Courts generally have found that disclaimers in manu-
als preclude employees from the right to promised benefits.152
Courts have been forced to interpret the language of handbooks
case by case in order to determine whether the employer stated an
offer,15 3 whether the offer was definite in form, 5 4 or whether the
147. One court capsulated the legal fiction of communicating an offer, when it
said about a benefit described in a memo, "This being the case, there was no com-
munication of the offer to appellants. And, there can be no acceptance of an offer
the existence of which is unknown." Alfaro v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 173 Ind. App.
89, 96-97, 362 N.E.2d 500, 505 (1977). Employees who bring suit, of course, know
about the benefit. Another court denied that the offer of benefits noted in a per-
sonnel manual was communicated to personnel managers to whom the employer
gave the manual for use in their work. Tobias v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 362
N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
148. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 32 (1979).
149. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (1987). "[A]n offer to make a contract shall be con-
strued as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances," i.e., acceptance either by promise or performance.
150. See Reporter's Note to § 12 in Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1964).
151. See supra note 126.
152. Andrew Hill, supra note 24, at 23.
153. In one case, a booklet called "Know Your Company" informed employees
that an annual bonus had been given every year for thirteen years. Because the
booklet stated that the amount of the bonus was at the discretion of the board of
directors, the board could decide to award no bonus, according to the court. Borden
v. Skinner Chuck Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 184, 150 A.2d 607 (1958).
Another court, however, found an employer's bonus plan created a binding
contract, even though the board of directors had discretion to grant the bonus and
decide the amount. See Wyss v. Inskeep, 73 Or. App. 661, 667-68, 699 P.2d 1161, 1165
(1985).
Another company's policy and procedure manual provided pay for unused vaca-
tion when an employee voluntarily terminated employment. See Dahl v. Bruns-
wick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 490, 356 A.2d 221, 232 (1976). Reading the words
"voluntarily terminated" literally, the court ruled that employees who were laid off
were not included. Id. at 490-91, 356 A.2d at 232. Still another company promised
"vacation with pay" in its employee handbook. See Phillips v. Memphis Furniture
Mfg. Co., 573 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). The court found, based on the
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employer withdrew the offer in a disclaimer. As a result, both em-
ployer and employee are uncertain about the terms of their agree-
ment. The resulting ambiguity is unfair to employees. Handbooks
and personnel policies raise expectations, but these "promises" are
illusory if the employer has exclusive control over applying the
promised benefits.55
3. Promissory Estoppel
Promissory extoppel, a doctrine which discharged employees
have argued successfully in egregious circumstances, 15 6 has been
less successful in enforcing delivery of employee benefits. The
leading case in the employee benefits area is Feinberg v. Pfeiffer
Co. ,157 in which the company awarded an employee a pension of
$200 per month for life. Seven years after the employee had re-
tired, the company reduced her pension to $100 per month.158 The
court held that the promise to pay $200 per month was binding
under the promissory estoppel theory because the employee had
reasonably and detrimentally relied on it. Her reliance was in
choosing to retire rather than continue to work, and in the
meantime she became disqualified from working as a result of age
and poor health.1 5 9
For types of benefits other than pensions, however, the prom-
issory estoppel theory has not served plaintiffs well. For example,
the same court that recognized promissory estoppel in a discharge
case' 6 0 refused to grant relief to an employee who had relied on a
handbook language, that an employee who had been discharged two weeks before
his scheduled vacation was not entitled to "vacation pay" in lieu of "vacation with
pay." Id.
154. See Wyss v. Inskeep, 73 Or. App. 661, 699 P.2d 1161 (1985). The employer
argued the terms of the bonus plan were not definite enough to be contractually
binding becasue the board of directors had discretion whether to grant a bonus and
in what amount. The court rejected the argument. Id. at 1165. Contra, Borden v.
Skinner Chuck Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 184, 150 A.2d 607 (1958) (annual bonus de-
scribed in booklet was given at discretion of board of directors; terms of bonus held
too indefinite to enforce).
155. Mauk, supra note 21, at 218.
Mauk views the development of implied unilateral contract theory as a small
advance toward "greater honesty in the workplace." Id. at 217. "Employers can no
longer offer attractive benefits and elaborate disciplinary procedures to employees,
reaping the advantages of a more stable, productive, and loyal work force, and
when challenged, pretend that the offerings were mere gratuities." Id.
156. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
157. 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
158. Id. at 165.
159. Id. at 168-69 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1979)).
160. Chantelier v. Robertson, 118 So.2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (employer
estopped from discharging employee who transferred his business to employer in
return for lifetime employment).
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promise of promotion and left his previous job.161 Other courts
have tied detrimental reliance to communication of the offer. One
court observed that when an employer has not intentionally com-
municated an offer of severance pay to an employee, no offer ex-
ists, "nor can there be reliance on such an offer."'162 Courts have
required that employees suffer substantial detriment as their part
of the bargain.163 Employees do not risk such detriment for a ben-
efit alone, so the benefits sued for on the promissory estoppel the-
ory generally accompany claims for wrongful discharge.
4. Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Finally, employees have argued that an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing entitles them to promised benefits.164
In the leading case, Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,165 a
Massachusetts court held an employee was entitled to commissions
on the goods he had sold. California courts have found the implied
covenant in discharges without just cause' 66 and to a benefits case
in which the employer egregiously eliminated a retiree's pen-
sion.167 Connecticut adopted the doctrine of implied convenant in
a benefits case in which the employer fired an employee to avoid
paying him bonuses and vested benefits.168
The implied covenant provides the basis for a cause of action
in contract for employees whose benefits have been withheld or
withdrawn.169 The implied covenant also provides relief for an
161. Servamerica, Inc. v. Rolfe, 318 So.2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
162. Alfaro v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 173 Ind. App. 89, 96-97, 362 N.E.2d 500, 505
(1977). See also Hilton v. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., 66 Wash.2d 30, 400 P.2d 772
(1965) (employer's oral communication to some employees of offer to pay severance
pay did not constitute an offer to other employees).
163. "[I]n a majority of jurisdictions, relinquishment by the employee of a job,
business or profession in order to accept.. .does not constitute special consideration
sufficient to support the contract." Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91
Mich. App. 254, 258, 283 N.W.2d 713, 715 (1979).
164. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
165. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). See supra notes 84-85 and accompany-
ing text.
166. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722 (1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981).
167. Wallis v. Superior Ct., 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984). But
see Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613
(1984) (rejecting tort claim for wrongful discharge and implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing claim for stock option benefits.
168. Cook v. Alexander & Alexander of Conn., Inc., 40 Conn. Supp. 246, 488 A.2d
1295 (Conn. Super. 1985). The employee won on public policy grounds as well as an
implied covenant theory. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
169. Robert Williams & Thomas Bagby, supra note 89, at 22.
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employer's bad faith actions,17 0 in tort as well as contract, in areas
where courts cannot find a statute to support a public policy excep-
tion.171 Thus, the implied covenant theory offers flexibility be-
cause it lies in both contract and tort. It is this very flexibility of
the doctrine, which commentators have criticized as confusing.172
In a California benefits case,173 the court sought to end the
confusion by clarifying the distinction between contract and tort
claims in the implied covenant. The court identified the factors
necessary for an implied contract claim as specified by the leading
California case 174 - the employee's long service and the com-
pany's established policies - and found the plaintiff had not estab-
lished either factor.175 Then the court defined the cause of action
in tort as a "bad faith action extraneous to the contract, combined
with the obligor's intent to frustrate the obligee's enjoyment of
contract rights."176 The court acknowledged that the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing was a "developing and confusing area of
the law,"'1 77 and subsequent California decisions have further
clouded the concept.1 78
Because of this confusion and unpredictability, as well as lack
of widespread judicial acceptance, the theory of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing has limitations in its application to
employee benefits suits.
C Problems With Application of At-Will Exceptions to
Benefits
Applying the at-will exceptions to benefits cases fails on two
170. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (pro-
viding relief for employer's retaliatory acts).
171. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. The elements of proof, defenses,
and remedies differ under contract and tort theories. See Mauk, supra note 21, at
208.
173. Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr.
613 (1984).
174. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (1980).
175. Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 478-79, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
176. Id. at 479, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
177. Id. note 7, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 619, note 7.
178. See Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860,
867 (1985) (Cleary factors not necessary to establish breach of covenant); Seaman's
Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 36 Cal. 3d 752 n.6 (1984) (im-
plying relief may be available without bad faith action by employer).
Recognizing whether an employment case, whether for discharge or for bene-
fits, is a tort or contract claim is important. The elements of proof, the nature of
arguments and defenses, and the remedies available differ in tort and contract
cases. See Mauk, supra note 21, at 208.
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levels. First, none of the individual exceptions applies to all situa-
tions in which an employee has formed a reasonable expectation of
benefits but the employer withholds or modfies the benefits.179
Second, the entire analysis is misdirected because it fails to take
into consideration the difference between discharge and benefits
cases.'8 0
1. Ineffectiveness of the Exceptions
Each of the at-will exceptions, while perhaps appropriate in
employee discharge cases, lacks universal application to employee
benefits. The case of Green v. Bettinger 181 offers an example. The
employer unilaterally reduced Green's commission rate which had
been in effect for eight years. 8 2 During those years Green's com-
mission depended upon the productivity of the department she
managed. 8 3 Over the eight-year period, Green's department in-
creased the company's billings from less than $30,000 per month to
over $50,000 per month, 184 with consequent increases in Green's
compensation. 8 5 The court held the employer had the right to re-
duce Green's commission rate unilaterally because he had the "un-
doubted right" to fire her. 86
The result in Green v. Bettinger was unfair to the employee.
The employer lured the employee into the job by promising a com-
mission. She increased departmental productivity which brought
more income to the employer. The employer received the benefit
of the incentives he offered but then withdrew those incentives.
None of the at-will exceptions could have been called upon to
achieve a just result for Green. The public policy exception is in-
applicable because reducing Green's commision was neither retali-
atory 8 7 nor contrary to a statutory or constitutional right or
privilege.188 The implied unilateral contract theory also is inap-
propriate because Green and the employer had a written document
that specifically set out the terms of the commission, including a
provision that if business losses made reductions in Green's com-
mission or salary necessary, the two parties would negotiate a rea-
179. See infra notes 187-98 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
181. 608 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1984). See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying
text.
182. Id. at 40.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 39.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 42.
187. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 116-43.
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sonable reduction.189 The implied contract theory is not applicable
where the agreement is express. 90
The application of promissory estoppel'91 does not achieve a
better result. The employer persuaded Green to work for him and
offered an attractive commission rate as incentive. Presumably
Green relied upon the promise. Courts generally have required
substantial detriment to the employee, however, for promissory es-
toppel to apply.192 Green was unemployed at the time the em-
ployer induced her to work for the company, and she showed no
evidence of other offers at the time the employer reduced her
commission, 93 so a court would have held that she suffered no
detriment.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 194 does
not apply because the theory requires bad faith intentions on the
part of the employer.195 Lack of just cause for the employer's act
is not necessarily bad faith.x96 When he reduced the commission
rate, Green's employer did not intend to retaliate against her or to
deprive her of compensation she had earned already. 197 The stan-
dard for good faith is subjective rather than objective.X98
Thus, all at-will exceptions have limited applicability in bene-
fits situations and consequently offer limited relief to employees
whose benefits have been reduced or withdrawn.
2. Conceptual Difficulties
Applying the at-will exceptions to employee benefits cases is
inappropriate as a general approach. First, the at-will doctrine by
its terms does not apply to benefits. The doctrine has so domi-
nated employment law that the policy underlying the rule is over-
looked. The purpose of the rule is to promote freedom of contract,
189. 608 F. Supp. at 41.
190. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 163.
193. 608 F. Supp. at 40.
194. See supra notes 164-68.
195. See supra notes 170-71.
196. See Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981) (find-
ing employer acted on incorrect information but not with bad motive).
Good cause is a substantial reason, one which is not arbitrary or capricious.
Good faith considers the superior power and advantage of the employer and prohib-
its abusive use of the employer's position. See generally Mauk, supra note 21, at
253-54 (distinguishing between good cause and good faith).
197. See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977) (finding employer terminated employee to avoid paying commissions on cash
registers employee had already sold).
198. See Gram, 384 Mass. at 664-65, 429 N.E.2d at 24-25.
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to allow both employer and employee the right to terminate an
unsatisfactory relationship. 199 Applying the at-will rule to benefits
does not further freedom of contract. Moreover, applying the doc-
trine to benefits cases and then searching for an exception to mod-
ify the doctrine to achieve a desired end leads to inconsistent
results.200
Finally, applying at-will exceptions has led to a focus on em-
ployer conduct rather than an examination of the agreement be-
tween the parties. Under the public policy exception2 0 1 and the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,202 courts have
looked for the employer's bad actions and malicious intentions.
Under the implied unilateral contract exception, courts have scru-
tinized how the employer expressed the offer and how she com-
municated it, rather than looking for the reasonable expectations
of the parties.203 Under the promissory estoppel theory, courts
have considered employer conduct in inducing the employee to
rely on a promise to the employee's detriment. 204 The court should
focus in each situation on what the employee's understanding was
and whether it was reasonable.
Part III. Proposed Method of Analyzing Benefits Cases
The employment-at-will doctrine may apply to employee dis-
charge, but courts should not impose it on benefits cases, in which
there is an ongoing employment relationship. This article pro-
poses that issues of employee benefits be separated from issues of
employee discharge. It also proposes that benefits be examined
from the standpoint of accepted contract law. Courts should ana-
lyze benefits without reference to the nature of at-will employ-
ment, applying the same analysis to contracts with a fixed term as
to those without a fixed term.
199. The employment-at-will rule "stands for the proposition that if the relation-
ship does not work out, for whatever reason, either party should be free to walk
away with a minimum of trouble." J. Ronald Petrikin, In Defense of Employment
At Will, 53 Okla. B.J. 2209, 2213 (1982).
200. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
204. Promissory estoppel is applied more reluctantly in employment cases than
in other contract relationships. See John Calamari & Joseph Perillo, supra note
64, § 6-5, at 287. Detrimental reliance on a void employment agreement creates no
rights because reliance on a void employment agreement creates no rights becasue
reliance on a void contract is considered to be unreasonable. Id. at 287, n.15. This is
not the usual rule for other contracts. Id. See Tatum v. Brown, 29 N.C. App. 504,
224 S.E.2d 698 (1976) (holding "doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply in
action for breach of employment contract").
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Employee benefits should be treated as part of the compensa-
tion for the employee's work.205 Under this reasoning, the benefit
is not a gratuity but is additonal wages.206 The employee provides
consideration by working for vacation,20 7 pension,20 8 severance
pay,20 9 or other benefits, just as for wages, but the time of receiv-
ing the "wages" is postponed. The deferred compensation is
earned in part each week that the employee works.210 The right to
employee benefits thus vests as soon as the employee has per-
formed substantial services for the employer.211
There are several avantages to this approach. First, there
would be more reasonable results in the interpretation of benefits
because well-established contract principles would apply.212 If an
employer and employee disputed whether a benefit was part of
205. Only a few jurisdictions have viewed employee benefits as part of the em-
ployee's compensation. See, e.g., Schneider v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 456 F.2d 366,
371 (6th Cir. 1972) (vacation pay); Local Union No. 186 v. Armour & Co., 446 F.2d
610, 612 (6th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (vacation pay); United
States v. Munro-Van Helms Co., 243 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1957) (vacation pay); In re
Willow Cafeterias, 111 F.2d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 1940) (vacation); Simpson v. Norwsco,
Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1102 (D.S.D. 1977) (applying Illinois law) (commission); Suastez v.
Plastic Dress-Up Co., 31 Cal. 3d 774, 183 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1982) (vacation pay); In re
Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 596, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371, 517 P.2d 449, 451
(1974) (retirement benefits); Chapin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 31
Cal. App. 3d 192, 198-99, 107 Cal. Rptr. 111, 116 (1973) (severance pay); Kulins v.
malco, a Microdot Co., Inc., 459 N.E.2d 1038 (Ill. App. 1984) (severance pay); Gram
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981) (commission); Martin v.
Mann Merchandising, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (severance
pay); Valeo v. J.I. Case Co., 18 Wis. 2d 578, 583-87, 119 N.W.2d 384, 387-89 (1963)
(vacation pay).
206. See Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 31 Cal. 3d 774, 183 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1982)
(vacation pay "is not gratuity or gift, but is, in effect, additional wages for services
performed").
207. See In re Willow Cafeterias, 111 F.3d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 1940).
208. See In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 596, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371, 517
P.2d 449, 451 (1974) (retirement benefits "do not derive from beneficence of em-
ployer, but are properly part of consideration earned by employee").
209. See Martin v. Mann Merchandising, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978) (severance pay is "benefit for which employees work as much as they work
for any other benefits held out to them as compensation by employer").
210. See Kulins v. Malco, a Microdot Co., Inc., 459 N.E.2d 1038, 1043 (Ill. App.
1984).
211. See Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 31 Cal. 3d 774, 183 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1982).
A Massachusetts court successfully separated the employment-at-will rule,
which governs discharge of the employee, from benefits earned as deferred com-
pensation. See Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981).
The court discussed whether the firing of the employee was based on "actual mal-
ice" and whether the covenant of good faith and fair dealing or public policy consid-
erations applied to the discharge. The court then made a separate disposition of the
employee's claims to comepensation for commissions. The court stated the em-
ployee "lost reasonably ascertainable future compensation based on his past serv-
ices." Id. at 671, 429 N.E.2d at 29.
212. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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their contract, the court could ascertain the intent of the parties by
examining their external manifestations of intent, using an objec-
tive standard.213 The court would not need to determine the em-
ployer's subjective intent as to whom he intended the offer to be
communicated, 214 whether he actually intended to make an offer
of a benefit,215 or whether his actual intentions were malicious. 216
Instead, the court would determine what each party understood
and whether each party's understanding was reasonable.217
The court would be able to fill in gaps and ambiguities by ref-
erence to the usual practices of the employer and the industry.2 18
If unanticipated circumstances arose, the court could imply a
meaning of the contract by determining what would have been the
intent of the parties if they could have foreseen the
circumstances. 219
Another advantage is that when benefits are considered part
of compensation, courts can avoid the pitfalls of the at-will excep-
tions. The ambiguities that arose under the legal fiction of unilat-
eral contract theory can be resolved. Consideration is no longer an
issue because the employee has earned the benefits, just as she has
earned wages, through her labor. Mutual consent is not an issue
because the employee agrees to benefits as well as salary when she
agrees to work for the employer. Without the encumbrances of
unilateral contract theory, communication of an offer of benefits is
not at issue; the compensation package is whatever both parties
reasonably believe it to be. Whether the benefits are communi-
cated in a written contract, by oral promise, or in an employee
handbook does not matter, as long as the employee has formed a
reasonable expectation of what the benefits are, based on the em-
ployer's external manifestations of intent.220
213. The objective interpretation has dominated contract theory for the past cen-
tury. John Calamari & Joseph Perillo, supra note 64, § 2-2, at 26. Learned Hand
wrote of the objective approach, "A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do
with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation
attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words,
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent." Hotchkiss v. National
City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
214. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
217. See Embry v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 127 Mo. App. 383, 105
S.W. 777 (1907).
218. The process of filling in gaps in the employment contract is analogous to a
court applying "industrial common law" in a labor law context. See United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
219. See Spaulding v. Morse, 322 Mass. 149, 153, 76 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1947) ("defect
may be supplied by implication and underlying intention...may be effectuated").
220. Based upon this reasoning, a Texas court reached the correct result in Mar-
1990]
Law and Inequality [Vol. 8:355
Applying traditional contract principles to benefits avoids
confrontation with the ambiguities of quasi-contract and tort in-
herent in the doctrines of promissory estoppe1221 and the implied
convenant of good faith and fair dealing222 Leaving aside the issue
of whether an employee had been wrongfully discharged or dis-
charged for cause, the court could still find the employee was enti-
tled to benefits she had earned up to the time of termination,
using contract theories of substantial performance or quantum
meruit.22 3
A third advantage is that courts could focus on the agreement
itself rather than on the conduct of the parties. Finally, this ap-
proach provides a better framework for dealing with employee
benefits because it is applicable to all employment relationships
that include benefits, whether the employment contract is at-will
or for a fixed term.
Using this approach, court more easily could resolve the issue
of unilateral modification of benefits. Applying contract principles
to the facts of Green v. Bettinger,224 in which an employer unilat-
erally reduced an employee's commission, 225 a court could have
found the employee had a reasonable expectation that her commis-
sion schedule would continue unchanged after eight years at the
same rates, unless modified by mutual agreement as her contract
described.226 What the intent of the parties was when they origi-
tin v. Mann Merchandising, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Even though
the employee learned about a severance pay provision from other employees, the
method of communicating the benefit did not matter becasue it was part of the con-
tract. Id. at 211. Another court, however, should have found that personnel man-
agers who read in the personnel manual that employees were entitled to meal
allowances when they worked overtime, should be awarded those benefits. See To-
bias v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 362 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). A court
could find it was reasonable for the employees to interpret a promise of benefits
printed in a manual and distributed by the employer as an external manifestation
of intent to grant those benefits.
221. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
223. Hadden v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 356 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1974)
(holding employee entitled to pension because doctrine of substantial performance
applies to employment contracts), 34 N.Y.2d 88, 312 N.E.2d 445, app. after remand,
396 N.Y.S.2d 210, 58 A.2d 154, modifed on other grounds, 410 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1978) 45
N.Y.2d 466, 382 N.E.2d 1136.
224. 608 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1984). See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying
text.
225. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
226. See Simon v. Riblet Tramway Co., 8 Wash. App. 289, 505 P.2d 1291 (1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973) (finding payment of bonus over a ten-year period
constituted implied contractual obligation when bonus was substantial part of em-
ployee's total compensation).
The Michigan Court of Appeals recently decided Dumas v. Auto Club Ins.
Ass'n, 168 Mich. App. 619, 425 N.W.2d 480 (1988) by applying contract principles.
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nally contracted and whether the terms were modified validly
would have been questions for the trier of fact.227 If there were
extenuating business reasons for doing so, the employer could
modify the commission schedule following the guidelines of the
Second Restatement.22 8
Whenever an employer chooses to provide employee benefits
in policies and practices, presumably the employment relationship
is enhanced. The employer gains a more productive, cooperative,
and loyal work force. The employer may change its policies from
time to time. The employee need not know the particulars of com-
pany policy for them to be enforceable, but he should be able to
have a sense that whatever policies are established at the time,
they will be applied fairly, consistently, and uniformly to each
employee. 229
Conclusion
The employment-at-will doctrine originally was based on the
philosophy of freedom of contract. The rule was intended to allow
either the employer or the employee to terminate an unsatisfac-
tory relationship. The rule has so dominated the employment re-
lationship, however, that courts have lost sight of the fact that by
its terms, the rule governs only terminations. Courts have imposed
the rule blindly and rigidly on all aspects of employment, holding
The employees brought suit against the insurance company challenging the em-
ployer's change of commission terms. The court stated that the employees might
have formed a legitimate and reasonable expectation that the commission was a
term of their employment. Whether they had such an expectation, "which bears
directly on the question of whether defendant was free to unilaterally change the
system," was a question for the trier of fact. Id. at 486.
227. Bullock v. Automobile Club of Mich., 146 Mich. App. 711, 719-20, 381 N.W.2d
793, 797 (1985).
228. See supra notes 103-104.
The court followed contract principles in interpreting a modification of com-
mission rates in Simpson v. Norwesco, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1102 (D. S.D. 1977) (apply-
ing Illinois law). The court found the employee was entitled to the higher
commission rate he had received before the employer unilaterally modified it. The
court observed that "one party to a contract cannot by his own acts release or alter
its obligations. The intention must be mutual." Id. at 1106. Illinois has held this
rule applicable "to any labor or employment contract." Id.
The court further observed that when the employee refused to accept the
change in commissions, the employer could have terminated the employment rela-
tionship, but "evidently, defendant considered plaintiff too valuable to do that." Id.
Because the plaintiff specifically rejected the proposed modification, his acceptance
of reduced paychecks did not constitute acceptance of the smaller commission. Id.
at 1107. Accord, Bartinikas v. Clarklift of Chicago North, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 959
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (employer could have discharged employee when he rejected modi-
fication of contract, but it could not ex parte impose modification).
229. See Dumas v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 168 Mich. App. 619, 425 N.W.2d 480
(1988).
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that because an employer may unilaterally discharge an employee,
she may unilaterally set all other terms of the agreement. The re-
sult has been employees who are deprived of earned compensation,
employers who are unjustly enriched, and an inconsistent state of
the law.
Ridgid application of the at-will doctrine to employee benefits
makes employment contracts different from all other contracts.
The better view is that benefits are part of the compensation for
which the employee works and not a gratuity from the employer.
Under this construction, issues of benefits can be approached and
adjudicated by established contract principles. Courts would not
need to search for exceptions to the at-will rule in order to award
employees what they sense is earned compensation. This approach
is applicable to all employment relationships, whether for a fixed
duration or not. The result would be consistency and certainty,
without eliminating the principle of freedom of contract.
